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NOTES & COMMENTS
THE TAX-STRADDLE CASES
The use of commodity futures "straddle" or "spread" transactions
to reduce tax burdens is a time-honored practice.' Because of their in-
creased popularity over the past decade, tax straddles have recently re-
ceived a great deal of attention from the Treasury Department2 and
from Congress.3 The Treasury Department has issued revenue rulings
disapproving of the practice 4 and has challenged thousands of tax re-
turns in which taxpayers offset losses generated by straddle transactions
against other income.5 In the first case to reach trial, Smith v. Commis-
sioner,6 the United States Tax Court denied the straddle losses claimed
by the taxpayers because the taxpayers lacked the requisite profit mo-
1. 12 TAX NOTES 209, 209 (1981) (testimony of Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan
at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Finance Committee (Jan. 6, 1981)).
2. See IRS, EXAMINATION TAX SHELTERS HANDBOOK, reprinted in Silver Prices and the
Adequacy of FederalActions in the Marketplace, 1978-80. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Com-
merce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm on Government Operations, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 368-69 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Silver Prices); Lewis, The Treasury'r Latest
Attack on Tax Shelters, I1 TAX NOTES 723, 723 (1980).
3. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 501-509, 95 Stat. 172.
This statute dramatically alters the tax treatment of commodity futures transactions by prospec-
tively eliminating the claimed losses from tax straddles. Section 503 of the Act requires unrealized
gains and losses in open futures positions to be valued by referral to their market prices on the last
day of the tax year and to adjust taxable income accordingly. For straddle positions that do not
consist entirely of regulated futures contracts, section 501 of the Act eliminates deductions for
losses incurred in switching transactions so long as offsetting positions are maintained. Offsetting
positions are broadly defined to include positions held in any actively traded personal properties
that in combination substantially reduce the taxpayer's risk of loss from holding either individu-
ally. Id. § 501(c)(2)(A). Section 502 eliminates early deductions for interest and carrying charges
allocable to straddles unless the straddles are hedging transactions. For a discussion of hedging,
see text accompanying notes 27-29 infra.
4. Rev. Rul. 78-414, 1978-2 C.B. 213 (Treasury bills straddles); Rev. Rul. 77-185, 1977-1
C.B. 49 (silver straddles).
5. As of January 16, 1982 there were 1,002 tax cases involving commodity futures straddle
losses docketed in the courts and 9,791 tax returns claiming such losses under audit by the I.R.S.
The I.R.S. completed audits on 333 returns involving claims of futures losses during fiscal year
1981. Two hundred and seventy-five of the 333 taxpayers have appealed I.R.S. assessments for
additional taxes totalling $8,130,969. Personal communication from Larry Batdorf, I.R.S. Nat'l
Office (Jan. 26, 1982). Consequently, even without additional challenged tax returns entering the
process, tax litigation concerning the treatment of futures straddles under the previous law has
continuing importance.
6. [Regular Decisions] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) No. 38,835 (78 T.C. No. 26, March 5, 1982).
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tive in entering the straddle transactions.7 The court, however,
rcognized the validity of the straddle as a legitimate transaction with
economic substance despite the arguments of the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) to the contrary.8
Although the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 has drastically
altered the tax treatment of straddle transactions, 9 the validity of the
transactions challenged in Smith and all cases involving disputed tax
returns based on straddle positions acquired on or before June 23,
1981, will be decided under the previous tax law. 10
The IRS first announced its intention to challenge the deductibility
of losses generated in commodity futures straddle transactions by issu-
ing Revenue Ruling 77-185.1 Numerous tax commentators have ques-
tioned the soundness of the ruling,' 2 and many taxpayers continued to
use tax straddles until the passage of the 1981 legislation.' 3 After an
introduction to commodity markets and straddle transactions, this note
reviews and criticizes both IRS's position in Revenue Ruling 77-185
and the Tax Court's holding in Smith v. Commissioner. This note goes
further and suggests an alternative legal basis that recognizes the eco-
nomic substance of straddle transactions and still allows courts to deny
deductibility of claimed losses in situations in which the nominal losses
do not reflect the taxpayer's true economic position.
7. Id. at 2850, 2&74-76.
8. See notes 75-118, 159-80 infra and accompanying text.
9. See note 3 supra.
10. The new tax provisions are applicable to "property acquired and positions established by
the taxpayer after June 23, 1981." Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 508(a), 95 Stat. 172. A significant amount of straddle trading continued until the June 23 dead-
line. See Tax-Straddle Vote, Market Surge Coincide, Wash. Post, Aug. 2, 1981, at HI, col. 1.
11. 1977-1 C.B. 48.
12. See, eg., Barbakoff & Sabin, Are All Silver Transactions Created Equal? An Analysis of
Revenue Ruling 77-185, 56 TAxEs 3, 5-6 (1978); Dailey, Commodity Straddles in Retrospect: Fed-
eralIncome Tax Considerations, 47 BROOKUYN L. REv. 313, 325-42 (1981); Goldfein & Hochberg,
An Analysis ofIRS'Ruling that Straddle Transactions Lack Requisite Profit Motive, 47 J. TAX. 142,
142-47 (1977); Levin & Zucker,- Commodities Trading: How It Works and Can Save a Client
Taxes, 8 TAX. FOR LAW. 40, 44 (1979); Levy, An Analysis of the Commodity Straddle as a Tax
Planning Device, 59 TAxEs 467, 475-80 (1981); Schwartz, Tax Opportunities andProblems of Inves-
tors in Options Markets, Commodities and Money Market Instruments, 31 U.S. CAL. L. CENTER
TAX. INST. 151, 178-80 (1979); Selig & Schmittberger, Tax Aspects of Commodity Futures Trading,
6 HoFsTRA L. Rv. 93,passim (1977); Waite, Futures and Taxes: Tax Spreads: Handle with Cau-
tion, COMMODITIES, Oct. 1978, at 29; Waite, Futures and Taxes: How Legal Experts View Key
Issues, COMMODITIES, Oct. 1978, at 33; Weinstein, Commodity Straddles-A New Tax Battle, 95
BANKING L.J. 70, 72 (1978); Tax Straddles Under Federal Government Fire, J. Com., Oct. 6, 1980,
§ 1, at 9, col. 4.
13. See Futures Shock: Commodities Industry Is Irked by Bills to End Tax Break on Strad-
dles, Wall St. J., Mar. 25, 1981, at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter cited as Futures Shock].
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I. THE COMMODITY MARKETS
Commodity futures contracts are traded in self-governed com-
modity markets called exchanges. 14 Rules that govern the exchange
must comply with the regulations of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), set up in 1974 to expand government control
over the futures industry. 15 Originally, only agricultural commodities
were traded on the exchanges, but in the twentieth century commodity
futures trading expanded to include nonagricultural-raw products, pre-
cious metals, and financial instruments.16
A. The Futures Contract.
Futures contracts, the basic instruments in futures trading, 17 can
be bought or sold only on commodity exchanges.'3 Under the contract,
the buying party is obligated to accept delivery of a standard quantity
and quality of the commodity at the designated future date and price. 19
The buying party is said to take the "long" position on the contract.
The selling party, who is obligated to deliver the commodity at the con-
tract price, is said to take the "short" position. Once the contract is
made, the buyer and seller deal with the exchange's clearinghouse, not
with each other. Therefore, if the trader wishes to cancel or close out
his futures contract before the delivery month, he need only enter the
market and purchase an offsetting position. For example, if a person
buys a futures contract for March delivery of 5,000 troy ounces of silver
14. G. GOLD, MODERN COMMODITy FuTUmS TRADiNo 13 (1975); R. TEWELES, C.
HARLow & H. STONE, THE COMMODITY FuTuREs GAME 23 (abr. ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
FuTuREs GAME].
15. See generally Rainbolt, Regulating the Grain Gambler and His Successors, 6 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1 (1977); Russo & Lyon, The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 57 (1977).
16. FuTuREs GAME, supra note 14, at 5-11; Arak & McCurdy, Interest Rate Futures, 4 FED.
REs. BANK N.Y.Q. REv. 33 (1979); Rainbolt, supra note 15, at 2-3, 14-15, 24-25; RapidExpansion
ofFinancialFutures May Prompt Adoratorium on New Issues, Wall St. J., Mar. 25, 1980, at 38, col.
2.
17. See G. GOLD, supra note 14, at 13.
18. Throughout this note the following conventions are used: A person entering the market
by buying a contract is called the buyer or the purchaser or holder of a long position. A person
entering the market by selling a contract is called the seller or the purchaser or holder of a short
position. Because the trader must pay cash to obtain either position, the word "purchase" is used
to describe any transaction in which a person obtains a futures position of any sort-long, short,
or straddle.
19. FuTuREs GAME, supra note 14, at 23. Prices are arrived at in a continuous double auc-
tion of bids and offers occurring on the exchange floor during trading hours. At the end of the
trading day, the exchange's clearing house substitutes itself as the oppdite party on all contracts
between buyers and sellers. The clearing house is, in essence, the buyeF from all sellers and the
seller to all buyers. From this point on, each trader deals with the clearing house, rather than with
the original opposite trader. Id. at 27.
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and then sells an identical contract at a later date, he is out of the mar-
ket. His obligation to make delivery to the clearing house in March
cancels his obligation to accept delivery from the clearinghouse in that
month. Over ninety-eight percent of al futures contracts are settled
this way rather than by actual delivery.20
B. The Concept of Margin.
The concept of margin has a fundamentally different meaning in
commodity futures trading than it does in securities trading. In securi-
ties trading, the margin represents a partial payment by the ultimate
buyer to the broker for stocks or securities. Because the buyer eventu-
ally must pay the full amount of the purchase price to the seller, the
margin account shows a debit that reflects the amount of the purchase
price financed by the broker. The size of the debit is limited by the
Federal Reserve, the stock exchange, or the broker himself.21
In contrast, the margin in commodity futures trading is not a loan
but a good-faith deposit, ensuring the ability of the contracting party to
fulfill his obligations22 and protecting the broker from adverse price
changes while the contract is open.23 For example, the amount of cash
required to purchase a contract to deliver silver does not depend on the
price of silver but on the probability that a change in the price before
delivery will require the investor to purchase the silver at a higher price
than the contract price at which he is obligated to deliver the silver.
The exchange may set minimum margins, but a broker may re-
quire additional amounts if he believes the risk of adverse price
changes warrants it3a Margin requirements of five or ten percent of the
contract value are common. In low-risk positions, such as certain
straddles, the amount may be even less.25
20. Id. at 24.
21. Id. at 17.
22. The futures contract and the accompanying brokerage agreement obligate the purchaser
of a commodity futures contract to do two things. First, in accordance with exchange standards,
he must deliver or accept delivery of the commodity during the contractual delivery period. Sec-
ond, he must respond to significant adverse daily price changes with a cash payment to his broker.
The broker is, in turn, obligated to respond to a call for cash from the exchange clearinghouse.
FuTuREs GAME, supra note 14, at 23-24.
23. Id. at 17-18. A contract is open until the trader purchases an offsetting position or deliv-
ery of the commodity eliminates or closes the contractual obligation.
24. Id. at 18.
25. Id. In fact, from May 19, 1975, until September 18, 1979, the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change clearinghouse required no margin on silver straddles for the first 500 contracts. R. Gray,
Report on Risk and Profit Potential of Spreads and Butterfly Spreads in Silver Futures 11 (Oct. 17,
1980) (unpublished report submitted to the U.S. Tax Court by the IRS in Smith v. Commissioner,
[Regular Decisions] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) No. 38,835 (78 T.C. No. 26, March 5, 1982)).
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Because margin requirements are low, an investor can purchase a
relatively large number of futures contracts with a modest cash outlay.
A large number of contracts multiplied by even small variations in the
price of a commodity can create dramatic gains or losses for the inves-
tor. The commodity futures investor, however, risks more than his ini-
tial investment. A broker may require additional margin deposits in
amounts greatly exceeding the initial margin investment because of ad-
verse price changes in the commodity.26
C. The Participants.
The traditional market traders can be divided into two broad cate-
gories: hedgers and speculators.2 7 Hedgers are usually manufacturers,
merchants, dealers, or producers who have an interest in protecting
themselves from price changes in the commodities that are an integral
part of their business or trade. A hedger may wish to protect the value
of his inventory from declining prices by selling futures contracts in the
commodity that constitutes his inventory. Any decrease in the value of
his inventory will then be offset by a corresponding increase in the
value of his short position in futures.28 Losses and gains from futures
contracts in the hands of hedgers are considered ordinary losses and
gains for tax purposes.29
Speculators include members of the public, commonly called in-
vestors or speculators, and floor traders trading on their own accounts,
commonly called locals or scalpers. Speculators seek to profit from a
price change in a given commodity.30 They are not interested in ob-
taining the underlying commodity but may occasionally take delivery if
a discrepancy between the cash market price and the futures price
makes it profitable.3' Commodity futures in the hands of speculators
are treated as capital assets for tax purposes.32
26. Because of the risk of margin calls made necessary by adverse price movements, see notes
22-23 supra and accompanying text, the initial margin deposit should not be considered the total
investment required except for certain straddles held for very short periods of time. See D.
Breeden, Variability in Gold and Silver Futures Spreads 20-34 (Mar. 1979) (unpublished paper on
file in the Duke Law Library).
27. Selig & Schmittberger, supra note 12, at 94.
28. See FUTUREs GAME, supra note 14, at 29-31. This definition of hedging is generally
accepted, but it is somewhat naive-many hedgers are in reality hedger-speculators.
29. See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52-53 (1955).
30. Selig & Schmittberger, supra note 12, at 94.
31. FuTuREs GAME, supra note 14, at 28-29.
32. Commissioner v. Covington, 120 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 822
(1942); Sluldrow v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 907 (1962); I.R.C. § 1221; Rev. Rul. 78-94, 1978-1 C.B.
58; Schwartz, Tax Opportunities and Problems of Investors in Options Markets, Commodities and
Money Market Instruments, 31 U.S. CAL. L. CENTER TAX INST. 151, 170-74 (1979).
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D. The Straddle Transaction.
A futures contract purchaser is said to have a net long position if
his long positions in a commodity exceed his short positions in the
same commodity. Conversely, if his short positions exceed his long po-
sitions in the commodity, he is in a net short position. 33 If the pur-
chaser has equal amounts of futures in the same commodity that are
long in one month and short in another month, he is said to be in a
straddle or spread position.3 4 The purchaser "buys" a long or "bull"
straddle if he is long in the more distant month's contract and the pur-
chaser "sells" a short or "bear" straddle if he is short in the more dis-
tant contract.35
When the purchaser straddles between months in this manner, he
has a time straddle. A trader can also straddle between different mar-
kets or between related commodities. 36 However, equal long and short
positions in the same commodity, in the same market, and in the same
month are not straddles; they cancel one another out.37 The straddles
that tax-motivated investors use are usually time straddles, although
they also may be intercommodity or intermarket straddles.38 In time
straddles, the investor's risk of loss and chance of profit from price
changes in the commodity are substantially less than the risk incurred
by the investor with a net long or short position. For instance, the loss
that a short contract incurs when the price of the commodity rises sub-
stantially requires a net short-position investor to increase his margin.
The net long-position investor enjoys an equivalent gain. The straddle
investor incurs no net gain or loss because the loss his short position
incurs is offset by the gain to his long position.39 This reduced risk of
loss is reflected in straddle margin deposits, which are substantially
lower than those required for indentical contracts purchased as net
positions.40
33. FuTuREs GAME, supra note 14, at 28, 217.
34. See Powers, Fact and Fiction About Spreads, COMMODITIES, July 1973, at 41; Schwager,
Understanding Spreading, COMMODITIES, Oct. 1974, at 10.
35. Ginsberg & Seidel, An Analysis of Select Comex Silver Futures Trades 6 (Oct. 22, 1980)
(unpublished paper prepared for the IRS and submitted by the IRS to the Tax Court in Smith v.
Commissioner, [Regular Decisions] TAx CT. REP. (CCH) No. 38,835 (78 T.C. No. 26, March 5,
1982)).
36. FuTuREs GAME, supra note 14, at 216-23; Schwager, supra note 34, at 11-12.
37. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
38. See Futures Shock, supra note 13, at 25. Any market combination usable for speculative
straddles can be used for tax straddles.
39. See FuTuREs GAME, supra note 14, at 33. The offset is not perfect, however. See notes
40-46 infra and accompanying text.
40. Tiger, The 'Limited-Aisk" Spread, COMMODITIES, July 1974, at 15.
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The purchase of a straddle is not, however, a risk-free transaction.
Even though losses or gains incurred by either leg of the straddle as the
price of the commodity fluctuates are of no economic consequence to
the investor-tax claims aside4I-actual profits and losses in straddles
do occur when the differential in commodity futures prices between the
different delivery months of the straddle narrows or widens.42 These
price differentials depend on the cost of storing and insuring the com-
modity and on the cost of borrowing money to finance the purchase of
the commodity.43 For perishable or seasonal commodities, the price
differences also reflect anticipated surpluses or shortages in the differ-
ent months.44 With nonperishable commodities, for which supply is
not a consideration and storage costs are low, the straddle differentials
primarily reflect current interest rates.45 When the price differential be-
tween the two months increases, a long straddle profits and a short
straddle loses; the reverse occurs if the price differential decreases.4 6
On a per-contract basis, straddles involve less risk than net posi-
tions in the same commodity. Lower straddle margin requirements re-
flect this lower risk, however, and allow a trader to purchase more
straddle contracts than he could net contracts with a given investment.
Thus, When measuring the total risk as a percentage of invested equity
rather than as risk per contract, straddles are often potentially as profit-
able as the corresponding net positions.47 In fact, when profits are mea-
sured in this way, straddles often outperform net positions.48
E. Offsetting Straddles-The Butterfly Straddle.
A short straddle and a long straddle can also be offset against each
other in a "butterfly" straddle.49 A butterfly straddle consists of long
positions in the nearest and most distant month bracketing an equal
number of short positions in an intermediate month or vice versa.50 An
example is a short March/May straddle offset by a long May/July
straddle.51 The two short positions in May create the "body" of the
41. These fluctuations are, however, of primary interest to the tax straddler. See text accom-
panying notes 57-60 infra.
42. Riess, Arbitrage as a Trading Medium, COMMODITIES, Mar. 1973, at 24.
43. See Powers, supra note 34, at 42; Schwager, supra note 34, at 13.
44. See Powers, supra note 34, at 42; Schwager, supra note 34, at 12-13.
45. Jacobs, Before You Trade Spreads, Beware ... , COMMODITIEs, Dec. 1974, at 32-33;
Schwager, supra note 34, at 10-11; see note 53 infra.
46. Schwager, supra note 34, at 10-11; R. Gray, supra note 25, at 19.
47. Tiger, supra note 40, at 15.
48. Id.
49. Ginsberg & Seidel, supra note 35, at 7; R. Gray, supra note 25, at 18.
50. Ginsberg & Seidel, supra note 35, at 7-8; R. Gray, supra note 25, at 18-20.
51. For a definition of short and long straddles, see text accompanying note 33 supra.
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butterfly, the long March and long July positions its "wings." The in-
tervals between delivery months need not be equidistant, although
equidistance is required for the two spreads to offset interest rate
changes perfectly.52 Butterfly straddles, whether perfect or imperfect,
significantly reduce the risks and the profit potential present in simple
straddles. 3
II. CLAIMED TAX ADVANTAGES OF STRADDLES
Straddles are composed of individual futures contracts that, al-
though obtained simultaneously as parts of a straddle,54 are identical to
contracts held in net positions. 5 These contracts can be disposed of
separately.5 6 A straddler may wish to maintain a straddle position in a
particular commodity, but have one of his positions in a near delivery
month replaced by a similar position in a more distant month. He can
do this by closing the near position and simultaneously establishing a
new position in a more distant month. This process, called "rolling" or
"switching" the straddle, is the essential element of the tax-motivated
straddle.
The motives of the tax straddler differ from those of other strad-
dlers.5 7 A bona fide straddle speculator seeks to profit from the change
52. R. Gray, supra note 25, at 20.
53. In simple straddles the trader will gain or lose when the interest rates change, assuming
commodity prices remain constant. For example, the holder of a short silver straddle (a bear
straddle) will profit if interest rates decrease. The price of a short straddle is based on the cost of
borrowing money to purchase silver during the delivery month of the straddle's earlier long posi-
tion and to hold the silver until delivery fulfills the obligation of the straddle's later short position.
Because the interest rate decreased after the straddler entered the market, his position is more
valuable because he can perform his obligations at a lower cost than the one reflected in the costs
of his contracts. The corresponding bull or long straddle has decreased in value because its holder
is obligated to pay more when he accepts delivery for his later long position than it will cost the
clearinghouse to purchase the silver from him during the earlier month, hold it until the later
month, and then redeliver it.
Dramatic increases or decreases in commodity prices will also affect borrowing costs and,
therefore, the differential. For example, when the price of a commodity increases, the total bor-
rowing cost increases even if the interest rate remains constant.
Butterfly straddles, by coupling a long straddle with a short straddle, eliminate most of the
risk of interest rate changes by putting the holder in the position of both profiting and losing from
any change in the differential. If the trader holds a perfect butterfly, one with the same number of
months between each wing and the body, all the risk from interest rate changes is eliminated. See
D. Breeden, supra note 26, at 1-3; R. Gray, supra note 25, at 18-20.
54. Powers, supra note 34, at 41-42.
55. The margin deposit required for establishing a straddle is, however, significantly less than
the deposit required for a comparable number of net positions. See text accompanying notes 24-
26 supra.
56. See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
57. The form of the tax-motivated straddle is identical, however, to that of any other
straddle.
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in price differential between straddle months. The tax straddler does
not seek to profit from changes in the differential; indeed, he prefers not
to risk the loss that may result from a change in the differential. The
tax straddler secures his straddle in an attempt to postpone and reduce
a tax liability stemming from a prior capital gain. To accomplish this
goal for the current tax year, the tax straddler purchases a large enough
number of straddles so that the normal movement in the price of the
commodity underlying his offsetting futures positions will create a
nominal loss in one leg of the straddle approximately equal to his prior
unrelated gain.58 The straddler can then "lift" the loss leg of the strad-
dle by closing the contracts that constitute that leg and realize what is
usually a short-term capital loss. This loss offsets the unrelated gain,
reducing or eliminating the straddler's current tax liability from the un-
related gain.59
The tax straddler immediately establishes an'other position in a
different month to protect his unrealized gain in the other leg of the
straddle from future price changes and maintains this position into the
next taxable year.60 If successful, the tax-motivated trader can take ad-
vantage of the greatly reduced risks per contract that straddle traders
enjoy. At the same time he receives tax benefits in the form of capital-
loss deductions on his nominal losses equal to those available to the
net-position trader. The net-position trader suffers a real economic loss
when he closes a losing position, whereas the straddle trader has an
unrealized gain that offsets his loss. Although this gain is unrealized, it
is, as part of a new straddle, at least partially protected from erosion
resulting from subsequent commodity price changes.
The process can be illustrated by an example of a simple tax strad-
dle discussed by the IRS in Revenue Ruling 77-185.61 In November
the investor, who has a large short-term capital gain from a real estate
transaction, purchases long silver contracts for delivery next March and
short silver contracts for delivery next July. In December the price of
silver falls. The investor closes out his long March position by selling
58. Thus, tax straddles are arranged in markets in which price differentials between months
are predictable even though the price of the commodity fluctuates.
59. The IRS has disallowed such losses. See text accompanying notes 75-81 infra. In Smith
v. Commissioner, [Regular Decisions] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) No. 38,835 [78 T.C. No. 26, March 5,
1982), the Tax Court upheld the IRS's disallowance, but, if the straddler can demonstrate profit
motive, his case arguably would be distinguishable from the holding in Smith. See notes 125-36
infra and accompanying text.
60. Statement of Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner, IRS, reprintedin Silver Prices, supra note 2, at
365-66; Futures Shock, supra note 13, at 25; Knight & Rowe, Silver Butterfly 'The Best Little Tax
Dodge inAmericas How It Works, Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 1980, at GI, col. 1.
61. 1977-1 C.B. 48.
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short an equal number of March contracts, thereby realizing a short-
term capital loss. The loss is approximately equal to his real estate
gain. He immediately reestablishes a straddle by purchasing long Sep-
tember silver; this purchase protects his unrealized gain in short July
silver. Thus, if the price rises, the gains on his long September con-
tracts will offset his short July-contract losses. The next year the inves-
tor closes out both straddle positions, realizing a short-term gain equal
to the previous year's loss, and, in effect, deferring his original short-
term gain on real estate for one tax year. This deferral can be repeated
each year for as long as desired.
If the price of silver had risen in December, the investor would
have switched his short July silver for, possibly, short September silver.
He then would realize the loss on his short position and carry the offset-
ting gain into the next year in the long position. If he keeps the strad-
dle open for at least six months62 and realizes the gain on the long
contract, he may claim long-term capital gain treatment.63 He thereby
succeeds in deferring a short-term gain taxable at a maximum of sev-
enty percent 64 into the next taxable year and converting it into a long-
term capital gain taxable at a maximum of twenty-eight percent.65
When the contracts which make up straddles are bought or sold
simultaneously, traders' bids and offers are proposed spread differen-
tials, not commodity prices. 66 Prices on the individual long and short
62. To keep the straddle open for over six months, he can switch his short March position for
one in a later month. In 1977 the Commodity Exchange, Inc. (COMEX), the principal exchange
for silver straddle trading, increased the span of contract months for silver futures contracts from
17 to 23. This action made it easier for silver straddle traders to maneuver. See Stalled Straddle:
IRS Ruling on Silver Puts 'Butterly Spread' Tax Shelter in Question, Wall St. J., June 6, 1978, at I,
col. 6 (hereinafter cited as Stalled Straddle).
63. Gain or loss realized by the holder of a short position in commodity futures is treated as a
short-term capital gain or loss regardless of how long the position is held. I.R.C. § 1234(b). Thus
conversion of short-term capital gains into long-term capital gains can be accomplished only when
the straddle is closed with the gain in the long position.
64. Short-term capital gains do not qualify for the 60% exclusion provided net capital gains.
See I.R.C. § 1202. Net capital gain is the excess of net long-term capital gain over net short-term
capital loss. I.R.C. § 1222. Because short-term gains are not eligible for the 60% exclusion, they
were subject to a maximum tax of 70% under the tax tables in effect through December 31, 1981.
Revenue Act of 1978, § 101, 92 Stat. 2767 (1978) (current version at I.R.C. § 1). The maximum
tax is now 50%. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 172.
65. Through June 9, 1981, the maximum tax on long-term capital gains was 28%/--the 70%
maximum tax imposed on the 40% of the net capital gain remaining after the 60% exclusion. See
note 64 supra. The maximum tax is now 50%. This change results in a new maximum tax on
long-term capital gains of 20%. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 102a, 95 Stat. 172.
66. STAFF OF THE JoINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG. 1ST SESs., BACKGROUND
ON COMMODITY TAX STRADDLES AND EXPLANATION OF H.R. 1293, 11 (Comm. Print 1981) (here-
inafter cited as BACKGROUND ON TAX STRADDLES); Stalled Straddle, supra note 62.
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positions comprising the contract are irrelevant 67 and are not estab-
lished by competitive bidding, but are agreed upon by the two traders
involved at a later time and outside the trading pit.68 Exchange rules
allow the traders to assign any price actually traded that day to one leg
of the straddle and any price within the exchange's daily price limits-
the maximum daily movement in the price of the commodity allowed
by the exchange-to the other.69 The only further restriction in the
traders' freedom to choose the prices of these positions is the require-
ment that the two prices assigned reflect the exact price differential on
which the traders agreed.70
This flexibility is of no importance to the normal straddle investor,
but offers a great advantage to the tax straddler. The tax straddler in
an active market can pick very high contract prices for some of his
straddles and low prices for others, often achieving the desired "loss"
and offsetting "gain" instantly.71 Until recently, the Commodity Ex-
change Incorporated (COMEX) made tax straddling even more conve-
nient by providing for after-hours trading sessions exclusively for silver
straddles. 72 In these sessions prices could be set in the same manner as
for straddles traded during the regular session, but the differential, in-
stead of fluctuating as it does during regular trading hours, remains
closely tied to the differential reflected in the closing or settlement price
of the session.73 Thus in the after-hour sessions the tax straddler had
the entire day's commodity prices from which to choose without the
risk of any undesirable differential fluctuations occurring during the
course of his trading.
67. See note 44 supra.
68. BACKGROUND ON TAX STRADDLES, su~pra note 66, at 11.
69. Id., Stalled Straddle, supra note 62.
70. BACKGROUND ON TAX STRADDLES, supra note 66, at II.
71. The taxpayers in Smith v. Commissioner used this method of "price fixing" to establish
instant losses in their straddle transactions. [Regular Decisions] TAx CT. REP. (CCH) No. 38, 835
at 2861-62 (78 T.C. No. 26, March 5, 1982).
72. Rule 502, silver rule 1(b) provided after-hours sessions for silver straddles; gold rule 1(b)
provided such sessions for gold straddles. 45 Fed. Reg. 43,820 (1980). Although the gold and
silver rules provide for such sessions to be called only under "extraordinary circumstances," id. at
43,820 n.l, silver sessions were routinely conducted by COMEX on a daily basis. 46 Fed. Reg.
23,516, 23,521 & n.57. Gold sessions, which are also authorized under exchange rules, have not
been held. Id. at 23,516. On April 27, 1981 the CFTC disapproved the two rules governing after-
hour straddle sessions and required all straddle trading to be conducted during regular trading
hours. Id. at 23,516. The CFTC's reasons for disapproval focused on the competitive effects of
such a rule; the tax aspects were not considered. See 46 Fed. Reg. 23,516, 23,516-23 (1981), 45
Fed. Reg. 43,820, 43,820-24 (1980). COMEX has challenged the CFTC's action in court. See
Comex Is Suing on Ban to One Session, Wall St. J., June 17, 1981, at 46 col. 5.
73. 45 Fed. Reg. 43,820, 43,821-22 (1980).
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The tax straddler uses the futures straddle to defer tax liability
from unrelated income by creating nominal losses on futures contracts
to offset the unrelated gains. The losses are nominal because the strad-
dler is almost entirely insulated from actual loss in the futures market
by the presence of offsetting positions. Additionally, if the unrelated
capital gain is short-term, the straddle can be used to convert it into
long-term gain by providing a holding period in which the gain is sub-
ject to little risk.74 Fluctuations in the differential and resulting
changes in the margin requirements do create some risk for the straddle
trader, but that risk is minimal. The straddle insulates the trader from
the risk of commodity price changes even though those price changes
are the means by which the trader realizes a nominal loss when he rolls
his straddle.
III. ANALYSIS OF TAx STRADDLES: REVENUE RULING 77-185 AND
Smith v. Commissioner
In Revenue Ruling 77-18575 the IRS disallowed losses claimed in a
tax-straddle transaction and presented two separate tax theories to jus-
tify this decision.76 First, the ruling relies on a "closed-transaction"
theory derived from Treasury Regulation 1.165-1(b).77 According to
this theory, the taxpayer establishes a balanced position with his initial
long and short contract purchases and remains in a balanced position
after the close of one long or short position because of his immediate
purchase of another long or short position.78 Because the straddler
continues to hold balanced positions, the IRS argues that the transac-
tion is not complete and that any deduction of losses is therefore pre-
mature.79 Second, the IRS claims that tax straddlers lack a profit
74. See Cooper, The Avoidance Dynamic: A Tale of Tax Planning, Tax Ethics, and Tax Re-
form, 80 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1553, 1566-70 (1980).
75. 1977-1 C.B. 48. The facts of Revenue Ruling 77-185 are a simplified version of the trans-
actions of two Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith customers, Harry L. Smith and Herbert J.
Jacobson, the petitioners in Smith v. Commissioner, [Regular Decisions] TAX CT. REP. (CCH)
No. 38,835, at 2851 (78 T.C. No. 26, March 5, 1982). See Futures Shock, supra note 13, at 25.
Smith and Jacobson actually used a butterfly straddle but the revenue ruling hypothetical uses a
simple straddle. The claimed tax advantages that are the subject of the ruling are identical to
those resulting from butterfly straddles. The relevant differences between the two straddles are
that the butterfly straddler must buy and sell twice as many contracts when switching months and
that there is less risk of actual loss in a butterfly straddle than in a simple straddle. See text
accompanying notes 49-53 supra.
76. 1977-1 C.B. 48. The ruling also disallowed deductions for out-of-pocket expenses. Such
deductions are allowed when the expenses are incurred in profit-motivated transactions. See
I.R.C. § 165(c).
77. T.D. 6735, 1964-1 C.B. 100, 101.
78. 1977-1 C.B. 48, 50.
79. See text accompanying notes 74-75 infra.
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motive in trading straddles.80 The IRS relies on section 165 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code, which requires that only losses incurred in a
"transaction entered into for profit" may be claimed to offset tax
liability.8'
In Smith v. Commissioner the Tax Court denied the taxpayers'
claimed straddle losses, finding that the particular straddle transactions
employed, when considered as a whole, lacked the requisite profit mo-
tive.82 In analyzing the straddle, the Smith court rejected four alterna-
tive rationales for its holding: the closed-transaction analysis of
Revenue Ruling 77-185;83 a wash-sale analysis, closely related to the
closed-transaction analysis but not based on I.R.C. section 165;84 a unit
approach which regards a straddle as a single unit rather than two sep-
arate contracts;85 and the step-transaction analysis which combines for-
mally independent but substantively interdependent steps into a single
extended transaction for the purpose of determining tax
consequences.86
A. Profit Motive.
Section 165(c) of the I.R.C. limits an individual's claim for a loss
deduction from a transaction occurring outside the scope of a trade or
business to losses incurred in transactions entered into for profit.8 7 The
IRS must determine profit motive on a case-by-case basis, by scrutiniz-
ing the substance of the transaction as well as the subjective belief of
the taxpayer.88 To find a profit motive, a "moral certainty that profit
will result" is not necessary; mere hope of monetary gain is sufficient.8 9
Transactions entered into for profit include transactions undertaken in
the hope of avoiding loss, but not transactions in which "the transac-
80. 1977-1 .C.B. 48, 50.
81. See text accompanying notes 87-90 infra.
82. Smith v. Commissioner, [Regular Decisions] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) No. 38,835, at 2871-73
(78 T.C. No. 26, March 5, 1982).
83. Id. at 2866.
84. Id. at 2873.
85. Id. at 2874-76.
86. Id. at 2866-67.
87. I.R.C. § 165(c)(2).
88. See Weir v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 996, 997-98 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637
(1940); Bessenyey v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 261, 274 (1965); Sabelis v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.
1058, 1062-63 (1962); Ewing v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 216, 233 (1953); Worcester Bank & Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 630, 632-33 (1928); cf. Hirsch v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 731, 736
(9th Cir. 1963) (applying dicta from Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 116 (1953), to profit-motive
questions: "Many cases in the federal courts deal with phases of the problem in the case at bar.
To attempt to harmonize them would be a futile task. They involve the appreciation of particular
situations, at times with borderline conclusions").
89. Fox v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1951).
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tion is clearly a losing one,. . . as where under all the circumstances
known to the taxpayer at the time it is a hopeless venture." 90
In Revenue Ruling 77-185 the IRS relied on Knetsch v. United
States9l and Brown v. United States92 in disallowing the short-term
capital loss and the out-of-pocket expenses deducted by the taxpayer.
Knetsch involved a scheme in which the taxpayer borrowed money
from an insurance company to pay for a deferred annuity bond
purchased from the same company. Using the annuity bond as secur-
ity, he then borrowed additional sums from the insurance company to
pay the interest on the annuity-bond loan: Because income from the
annuity bond was not taxable until received and interest was deductible
when paid, the taxpayer had a substantial nominal loss which he
sought to use to offset other income.93
The IRS disallowed Knetsch's interest deduction, claimed under
section 163(a) of the I.R.C., and the disallowance was upheld by the
Supreme Court.94 In a later year Knetsch abandoned the annuity
scheme and claimed out-of-pocket loss deductions for the excess of the
interest and cash he paid to the insurance company over the "loans"
and cash value remitted to him upon termination of the annuity. 95
Knetsch justified the deductions as losses incurred in a transaction en-
tered for profit under section 165(c)(2) of the I.R.C. or, alternatively, as
expenses paid for management, conservation or maintenance of income
under section 212(2).96
The Court of Claims agreed that the taxpayer had suffered a loss
within the meaning of section 165 of the I.R.C., but held that the tax-
payer had failed to meet the requirement of section 165(c) that the loss
be incurred in "transactions entered for profit. ' 97 The court also held
that profit motive was required in order for the taxpayer to claim out-
of-pocket expenses under section 212(2) of the I.R.C.98 The court con-
cluded that the taxpayer did not intend to use the annuity for its poten-
tial profit features, but rather that the taxpayer's "'annual borrowings
kept the net cash value, on which any annuity or insurance payments
would depend, at the relative pittance of $1,000.' "99
90. Id.
91. 348 F.2d 932 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
92. 396 F.2d 459 (Ct. CL. 1968).
93. 348 F.2d at 934.
94. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 362, 367-70 (1960).
95. Knetsch v. United States, 348 F.2d 932, 934 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
96. Id. at 935.
97. Id. at 936.
98. Id. at 939.
99. Id. at 939 (quoting Knetsch v. United States, 361 U.S. 361, 366 (1960)).
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The Knetsch court also considered the possibility of mixed motives
in a transaction, observing that although a motive to effect a tax reduc-
tion cannot produce a transaction entered into for profit in the statutory
sense, "a prohibited profit motive or intent" such as tax avoidance, can
exist "side by side with a legitimate profit motive or intent and meet the
statutory requirement."'' 00 The Knetsch court did not, however, reach
the question whether a dominant tax-avoidance motive causes disal-
lowance of an interest deduction despite the presence of a secondary
permissible profit motive. Dicta from the case indicates that the deduc-
tion would be allowed.' 0'
In Brown the taxpayer realized that under the Kne/sch rule he
could not deduct interest from a transaction not entered into for profit,
so he sought to claim pre-paid interest as an expense and deduct it as a
capital loss under section 212 of the I.R.C.'0 2 In disallowing the capi-
tal-loss deduction, the court again conceded the reality of the loss and
stressed that the recognition of a capital loss is not sufficient to establish
its deductibility; the loss still must meet the profit-motive requirements
of section 165(c).' 0 3
Together, the two Knetsch cases and the Brown case stand for the
principle that losses, interest payments, and out-of-pocket expenses in-
curred in transactions entered into with no profit motive are not de-
ductible under sections 163, 165 or 212 of the I.R.C. The problem of
mixed-motive transactions is the major difficulty the courts will face in
applying the profit-motive test to tax-straddle transactions. The courts
must determine which standard to apply under section 165 to straddle-
trading transactions in which the tax-avoidance motive dominates a
weak but existing profit motive.
An analysis of the profit-motive cases indicates that if the taxpayer
can show a subjective intent to profit from the straddle, and prove
100. Id. at 936.
101. The word purpose carries with it not only taxpayer's intent, but also his motive for
entering the transaction. Thus, you can have a profit intention side-by-side with a non-
profit motive. However, the statutory requirement "for profit" can be satisfied by either.
By the same token, you can have a prohibited profit motive or intent and meet the statu-
tory requirement.
Id. at 936.
The court added:
We think that the reasoning in Goodstein [that expenses although incurred in con-
nection with transactions which had been entered into solely for the purpose of avoiding
tax, are deductible if the expenditure gives rise to a contractual obligation, which if car-
ried out would give rise to a profit or a loss] is correct if the reviewing court is not faced
with the factual determination that the contractual obligation was not itself a sham.
Id. at 938 (emphasis in original).
102. 396 F.2d at 463.
103. Id. at 465-66.
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profit potential in his straddle transactions, he will probably withstand
any profit-motive attack on his deductions despite the presence of a
strong tax-avoidance motive. Judicial standards that ignore the pres-
ence of a significant, bona fide profit motive in certain instances do not
reach the tax-straddle situation.
1. Primary or dominant-motivation test. The primary-motivation
test used by the Supreme Court in Helvering v. National Grocery Co. I
indicates that obtaining a loss deduction under the predecessor to
I.R.C. section 165(c)(2) "may depend on whether the taxpayer's motive
in entering the transaction was primarily profit."' 0 5 Courts have ap-
plied the primary profit-motive test in situations in which taxpayers
claim deductions for losses in transactions supposedly entered into for
profit10 6 or for expenses alleged to have a business purpose. 0 7 The le-
gitimate profit motive in these cases is combined with other motives
such as personal pleasure or generosity that, standing alone, do not
support a deduction.' 08 The primary-motivation test has not been ap-
plied, however, to situations in which a tax-avoidance motive is joined
with the profit motive or business purpose.
2. Sign'ficant-motivation test. Under the significant-motivation
test, the deduction of a loss is disallowed when there is proof of a sub-
stantial tax-avoidance purpose despite the presence of even a dominant
legitimate purpose. Courts have applied this more stringent standard
only when a statute either specifies its application or implies such by its
intent to prohibit a particular form of tax avoidance. A version of the
test was employed under federal estate tax provisions of section 2035 of
the I.R.C., 0 9 which created the rebuttable presumption that transfers
made within two years of death were made in contemplation of
104. 304 U.S. 282 (1938).
105. Id. at 289 n.5. But see Weir v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 637 (1940) (indicating that any bona fide profit motive is sufficient to allow a loss and it does
not have to be the primary motive).
106. I.R.C. § 165.
107. I.R.C. § 162.
108. See, e.g., Lamont v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 377, 380 n.4 (2d Cir. 1964); Hirsch v. Com-
missioner, 315 F.2d 731, 736 (9th Cir. 1963); Austin v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 583, 584 (2d Cir.
1962); Arata v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 576, 578 (2d Cir. 1960); Meuer v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d
223, 224 (2d Cir. 1955); Ewing v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 438, 439 (2d Cir. 1954); Feine v. Mc-
Gowan, 188 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1951); Gevirtz v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 707, 708 (2d Cir.
1941); Jasionowski v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 312, 319 (1976).
109. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 2035(a), Pub. L. No. 68-591, 68A Stat. 381 (re-enacting
Revenue Act of 1918, § 402(c), 40 Stat. 1057, 1097)).
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death.110 Another version of the test is used under the accumulated-
earnings provisions of sections 531-537 of the I.R.C."' The statutory
language and legislative history of the accumulated-earnings provisions
direct the use of the substantial-purpose test.' 12 There is no equivalent
legislative intent to guide the courts in determining which standard to
apply in section 165(c) profit-motive determinations. 13
110. See United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 115, 118 (1930) (construing Revenue Act of
1918, § 402(c), 40 Stat. 1057, 1097). Although the decision can be read as invoking a dominant-
purpose test rather than a significant-purpose test, a close reading reveals that a clear showing of a
testamentary purpose as a significant motive for the transfer creates tax liability under Wells. A
contrary motive, even if dominant, will defeat the statutory presumption that transfers to the
transferor's beneficiaries within two years of his death (3 years in later versions) are made in
contemplation of death only where there is no showing that contemplation of death is a motive at
all. See 283 U.S. at 115-18. The "contemplation of death" language was carried over into the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 at section 2035, Pub. L. No. 68-591, 68A Stat. 381. Section 2035
was amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1525, 1848. The new
provision eliminated the "contemplation of death" presumption and substituted an objective test
that, with a few specific exceptions, requires that all transfers made within three years of death
regardless of motive be included within the estate for estate tax purposes. I.R.C. § 2035(a). As the
legislative history reveals, the motive question inherent in the "contemplation of death" language
of the previous statute was the major reason for the new provision:
The presumption that gifts made within three years of death are in contemplation of
death has caused considerable litigation concerning the motives of decedents in making
,ifts. Your committee believes that this problem should be eliminated by requiring theinclusion of all such gifts in the gross estate without having to attempt to ascertain the
motives of the decedent.
H. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS
3356, 3366.
111. United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297 (1969). The Court stated:
The Government contends that in order to rebut the presumption in § 533(a) [un-
reasonable accumulation of earnings and profits is presumed determinative of the pur-
pose to avoid income tax], the taxpayer must establish by the preponderance of the
evidence that tax avoidance . . . was not "one of the purposes" for the accumulation
We conclude from an examination of the language, the purpose, and the legislative
history of the statute that the Government's construction is the correct one.
Id. at 301. The report of the Senate Finance Committee, quoted in.Donruss, discussed the ration-
ale for the stringent rule in section 533: "The proposal is to strengthen [the evidentiary] section by
requiring the taxpayer by a clear preponderance of the evidence to prove the absence of aly
purpose to avoid surtaxes upon shareholders." Id. at 303 (quoting S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. 5 (1938)) (emphasis in original).
112. See United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 303-08 (1969); United States v. Wells,
283 U.S. 102, 115-18 (1930).
113. Section 531 was intended to address a particular tax-avoidance problem, and the strong
significant-motivation test is justified by the specificity of the statute's purpose. See note 119
supra. Congress did not design section 165 to focus specifically on tax-avoidance motives. To the
contrary, the provision which is now I.R.C. section 165(c) was originally introduced to expand the
categories of transactions in which losses could be claimed to include transactions entered for
profit. Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1057. Previously such losses could not be deducted unless
sustained in transactions involved in a business or trade. H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1918). Although the provision has been added to and rearranged since its enactment, its sub-
stance remains the same.
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Like section 165(c), but unlike section 531, the language and legis-
lative history of section 2035 prior to 1976 did not suggest the applica-
tion of any particular standard for measuring mixed taxpayer motives.
Acting without legislative guidance, the courts measured taxpayer in-
tent under a dominant-purpose test unless the competing motive was
tax avoidance. When tax avoidance was the competing motive the
courts used a significant-motive standard.' 14 Despite the rough similar-
ity of the section 2035 tax-avoidance situation to that of the tax strad-
dle, there are compelling reasons not to extend the significant-motive
standard to more general areas in which tax-motivated behavior is ob-
served. First, Congress has abandoned the contemplation-of-death
motive inquiry for section 2035 primarily because of difficulties in its
application. 1 5 Under section 165(c), the inquiry into motive is even
more difficult because of the greater variety of situations that are en-
compassed by that section. Second, application of a judge-made signif-
icant-purpose test would defeat congressional intent in many instances.
Congress uses tax benefits to encourage certain taxpayer behavior and
intends tax avoidance to be a significant motivation for that behavior.
Under the significant-motive test, a court disallows a deduction when
the taxpayer is motivated by tax avoidance even if his primary goal is
to make a profit in a manner consistent with Congress's policy objec-
tive.116 Finally, in cases in which the statute does not dictate or imply
the appropriate standard, courts have. held that any bona fide transac-
tion, unless trivial, produces deductible losses even if the dominant mo-
tive is to reduce taxes."17
The profit-motive cases cited in Revenue Ruling 77-185 involve
sham transactions in which the courts held that no significant profit
motives existed."" Courts have recognized that the presence of a tax-
avoidance motive will not destroy the validity of an otherwise legiti-
mate transaction without demonstrated, contrary congressional intent.
Thus the courts have never applied the primary-motivation test to
114. See United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 117 (1930); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Bowers, 98 F.2d 794, 798-99 (2d Cir. 1938).
115. See note 110 supra.
116. As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed: "If tax avoidance, within the
rules, is to take a case out of a deduction provided by statute, we think every legally advised
taxpayer is going to find himself in very hot water." Evans v. Dudley, 295 F.2d 713, 715 (3d Cir.
1961).
117. In United States v. Consumer Life Ins. Co., 430 U.S. 725 (1977), the Court stated, "Tax
considerations may well have had a good deal to do with the specific terms of the treaties, but even
a 'major motive' to reduce taxes will not vitiate an otherwise substantial transaction." Id. at 739.
See Wiggin v. Commissioner, 46 F.2d 743, 745-46 (1st Cir. 1931); Terry v. United States, 10 F.
Supp. 183, 185 (D. Conn. 1934); Starr v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 450, 460 (1966).
118. See notes 96-113 supra, and accompanying text.
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mixed motive cases where tax avoidance competes with the legitimate
motive and have applied the significant-motivation test in such cases
only when Congress has specifically required such a standard.
3. The Tax Court's profit-motive analsysis. The Tax Court was
able to avoid mixed-motive analysis in Smith v. Commissioner,' 19 the
first court test of Revenue Ruling 77-185. Smith involved the prototyp-
ical tax-straddle transaction where taxpayers, seeking to shelter large
gains obtained in transactions unrelated to straddle investments, turn to
the tax straddle. The Smiths and the Jacobsons employed the Tax
Straddle Department of Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith
(Merrill Lynch) for this purpose. 120 The IRS disallowed their claimed
losses resulting from commodity straddle trades, and they appealed to
the Tax Court. The Tax Court held that their losses were not incurred
in transactions entered for profit and therefore were not deductible.' 2'
The Tax Court looked both at the subjective intent of the taxpay-
ers and at the objective nature of the tax-straddle transaction. The tax-
payers had no independent knowledge of the profit potential of
straddles and relied upon the descriptions of the straddle transactions
and the projections of possible outcomes provided by representatives of
Merrill Lynch. 22 Merrill Lynch's representatives stressed the tax bene-
fits of the transactions and the possibility of economic loss inherent in
the transactions but estimated that the best possible outcome from the
straddle, tax considerations aside, would leave each taxpayer $1,000
poorer. 23 Thus the court concluded that neither the taxpayers nor
Merrill Lynch subjectively viewed the overall tax-straddle scheme as
offering the possibility of economic profit.124
The court's analysis of the inherent economic substance and profit-
ability of the straddle was limited to tax straddles, while the IRS at-
tempted to encompass all straddles.1 25 The IRS argued that straddles
in general lacked economic substance 126 and that if straddles were held
to have substance, then a proper accounting of losses for tax purposes
would require an integration of the various steps of the straddle into a
119. [Regular Decisions] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) No. 38,835 (78 T.C. No. 26, March 5, 1982).
120. Id. at 2851-82.
121. Id. at 2876.
122. Id. at 2875.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2874-76.
125. For the IRS position see notes 87-118 supra and accompanying text. For the court's
position see notes 119-124 supra and accompanying text.
126. See Smith v. Commissioner, [Regular Decisions] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) No. 38,835 at
2862 (78 T.C. No. 26, March 5, 1982).
[Vol. 1982:114
TAX-STRADDLE CASES
single transaction under either the closed-transaction analysis 127 or the
step-transaction doctrine. 128 The court upheld the validity of the strad-
dle against this substance attack 129 and ruled that the various positions
obtained were separate and should not be integrated for tax
purposes.1 30
Despite the court's ruling on the form and substance of the strad-
dle, the court departed from this general view in its examination of the
profit motive inherent in a tax straddle as opposed to a simple straddle.
The court's profit-motive analysis of the tax straddle appears to be a
step-transaction analysis limited to the purpose of determining profit
motive. The court found the commodity tax straddle to be a "prear-
ranged, planned sequence of trading" calculated to achieve certain tax
benefits, as opposed to "simple investments in butterfly straddles held
solely for non-tax profit objectives." 13 ' Thus, according to the court,
the proper unit to examine for profit motive is "the entire tax straddle
scheme," which it determined to be a single "transaction" 32 for the
purposes of I.R.C. section 165(c)(2). 133
Viewed prospectively, the court's holding is encouraging to many
tax straddlers, especially those whose contested returns were filed after
the publication of Revenue Ruling 77-185, because it suggests that tax
straddle losses will be upheld where the investor designs his straddle
transactions in such a way as to create the possibility of economic gain
from the overall transaction. 34 The straddle transaction can yield tax
savings that are greatly disproportionate to its non-tax economic poten-
tial.' 35 In future tax straddle cases if the taxpayer is able to show that
he was aware of and, in part, motivated by the profit potential of his tax
straddle, the mixed-motive analysis might prove inevitable. The Smith
court's dicta, following the precedent in profit-motive cases, indicates
that the losses claimed in such a mixed-motive transaction would be
127. Id. This is the closed-transaction argument or wash-sale rule. See 1977-1 C.B. 48, 50.
See notes 159-81 infra and accompanying text. The Tax Court dealt with the closed-transaction
argument separately from the wash-sale analysis but refused to apply either. See [Regular Deci-
sions] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) at 2863-67.
128. See id. at 2862.
129. Id at 2850, 2863-66.
130. Id. at 2850, 2866-67.
131. Id. at 2874.
132. Id.
133. This approach mooted the taxpayers' arguments for the validity of straddle transactions
in general. It also mooted any argument which a tax straddler might make concerning the sub-
stance of a single-component transaction of his tax-straddle scheme, although the court felt that it
would have reached the same conclusion if it had examined the transactions individually. See id
at 2881 n.30.
134. See notes 120 infra.
135. See notes 54-65 supra and accompanying text.
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allowed. 136
The IRS may be able to avoid the mixed-motive analysis even
where the taxpayer can make such a showing by focusing its profit mo-
tive requirement on the single transaction that is critical for the tax-
motivated trader but seldom used by the legitimate straddle trader.
That transaction is the rolling of the straddle's loss leg that is executed
before the close of the taxable year to generate losses. 137 Although the
switch has substance and does not leave the trader in the same posi-
tion, 38 it may often leave the trader in a worse position. Thus the tax-
payer may find it difficult to show that he reasonably expected to profit
from his new position.139
4. Double taxation causedby theproft-motive analysis. A finding
of liability in a tax straddle case based on the profit-motive analysis
creates a harsh result. When a tax straddler loses his claimed deduc-
tion for straddle losses in the first year of a tax straddle because the
court finds no profit motive in the transaction, he is taxed on the full
amount of the gain he was attempting to shelter. Then, in the next
year, he is taxed on the "gain" realized by closing out his tax straddle.
This artificial "gain" bears as little resemblance to the taxpayer's eco-
nomic position as did the straddle loss. Nevertheless, double taxation
is an inevitable result of the application of the profit-motive analysis to
the tax straddle transaction.
Although the Tax Court's holding in Smith was based on a profit-
motive analysis and resulted in double taxation, the court's recalcula-
tion of the taxpayers' straddle losses and gains had the effect of mitigat-
ing the harshness of the result in that particular case.' 40 Because the
straddles in Smith were traded in the after-hours straddle call ses-
sion, 14' the court viewed any prices assigned to the contracts other than
the closing or settlement prices as artificial. 142 Although the exchange's
rules allow the assignment to straddle leg contracts of virtually any
136. See [Regular Decisions] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) at 2874. See note 17 supra and accompa-
nying text.
137. See text accompanying notes 54-60 supra.
138. See note 160 infra and accompanying text.
139. To prove a reasonable expectation of profit, the taxpayer must provide some evidence of
a change in the market from which he seeks to profit by altering his straddle position. See Gins-
berg & Seidel, supra note 35, at 2-3, 37-41; Levy, supra note 129, at 479.
140. See Smith v. Commissioner, [Regular Decisions] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) No. 38,835, 2867-
71, 2879 nn.24-25 (78 T.C. No. 26, March 5, 1982).
141. See notes 66-73 supra and accompanying text.
142. See [Regular Decisions] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) at 2867-68.
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prices occurring within the day's trading limits to the straddle legs, 143
the court, characterizing the straddle transaction as an "exchange of
contracts," 144 felt free to ignore the prices set by the parties to the ex-
change and to assign fair market value to the positions. 145 The court
found the fair market value to be the day's settlement price and recal-
culated the straddle transactions on that basis. 146
COMEX was the only exchange to use an after-hours session, 147
and the COMEX session involved only silver straddles.' 48 As a conse-
quence the court's recalculation method cannot properly apply to strad-
dle transactions executed on other exchanges or in other commodities.
The Smith court did not mention how it would determine prices for
contracts executed during regular trading hours where reference to the
settlement price would be as artificial as relying on the prices allowed
under the exchange's rules. Presumably any court trying to determine
the actual price of contracts comprising the straddle would confront the
same problem that convinced the Smith court to reject the unit ap-
proach: the practical difficulty of having to determine the price at
which open positions were trading on the exchange floor at the instant
the straddle trade was executed. 149
A tax straddler who generates nominal straddle losses by actual
rises or falls of the price of the commodity in the market may have his
entire straddle loss deduction upheld by a court following Smith pro-
vided he meets the profit-motive burden. If he fails to meet this burden
he will be taxed twice.
B. The Unit Approach.
As mentioned above, the true measure of the straddle's economic
substance is the differential between the contracts comprising each
leg.150 The unit approach discussed in Smith would require the tax
consequences of straddle trading to be based on this differential rather
than the actual prices of the straddle's component futures contracts. 15'
143. Id. at 2861-62; BACKGROUND ON TAX STRADDLES supra note 66, at 11; Stalled Straddle,
supra note 62.
144. [Regular Decisions] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) at 2870.
145. See id. at 2870, 2879 nn. 24-25.
146. See id.
147. 45 Fed. Reg. 43,820, 43,822 n.15 (1980).
148. Id. at 43,821 & n.7 (1980).
149. See [Regular Decisions] TAX CT. REP. at 2866.
150. Chipser v. Kohlmeyer & Co.; 600 F.2d 1061, 1068 (1979); Smith v. Commissioner, [Regu-
lar Decisions] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) No. 38,835, at 2868 (78 T.C. No. 26, March 5, 1982). See
notes 41-48 supra and accompanying text.
151. See [Regular Decisions] TAX CT. REP. at 2866, 2878 n.14.
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The unit approach alters the conventional tax treatment of strad-
dles whenever one straddle leg is switched while leaving the other leg
of the straddle in place. In this situation the unit approach requires the
value of the remaining open position to be offset against the price at
which the other leg was closed out in the switching transaction.1 52
When both legs of a straddle are bought and sold simultaneously, the
tax result under the unit approach will be identical to that of the con-
ventional analysis which treats each futures contract independently.
This is true because in simultaneous closing of both legs of a straddle
the artificial gains and losses on either leg cancel each other out. 153
The Tax Court conceded that the unit approach had "much to rec-
ommend it from an economic standpoint."'154 Nevertheless the court
rejected the approach, suspecting that "problems of proving what the
untraded leg's price was at the exact moment of the other leg's trade
.. . would be enormous."155 The court also felt that such an approach
would "introduce an element of arbitrariness" into the tax treatment of
commodity futures by taxing straddles achieved by simultaneous trades
under the unit analysis while otherwise identical straddles achieved by
consecutive trades-one leg at a time-would not be so taxed.15 6
Recognition of these problems may be one reason why the IRS did
not adopt the unit approach in its treatment of straddles. Nevertheless
the closed-transaction approach pursued by the IRS and the step-trans-
action approach reflect the true economic reality of a straddle transac-
tion by withholding recognition of losses until the remaining straddle
positions are closed out and previously unrealized gains are realized
and netted against the nominal losses realized earlier. 57 By requiring a
taxpayer to report gains and losses in open positions as well as those
which are closed out, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 arrives
at the same tax result as would the unit approach, closed-transaction
analysis, and the step-transaction analysis.158
C. The Closed-Transaction Analysis and the Wash-Sale Rule.
The IRS argues in Revenue Ruling 77-185 that the sale of the ini-
tial long position of a straddle does not constitute a change in the tax-
152. Id. at 2866.
153. See note 39 and accompanying text.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See discussion of the closed-transaction analysis at notes 159-81 infra and accompanying
text. See discussions of the step-transaction doctrine at notes 182-208 infra and accompanying
text.
158. Id. See note 3 supra.
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payer's economic position.159 The argument relies on the assumption
that the later straddle, which has a long position of the same magnitude
as the earlier one but has a different delivery month, is virtually identi-
cal to the previous straddle. Accordingly, the "switching" transaction
should have no tax consequences because "switching" delivery months
is an exercise with no economic substance. The argument concludes
that switching leaves the taxpayer in virtually the same ongoing posi-
tion and that the taxpayer has not "closed and completed" the straddle
transaction for loss deduction purposes as required by Treasury Regu-
lation 1.165-1(b). 160
The two straddles are, however, usually not identical. Often, the
nature of the straddle changes when the taxpayer closes out a loss posi-
tion and establishes a new straddle. He may find himself holding a
bear straddle rather than his previous bull straddle. Bear straddles and
bull straddles perform oppositely under identical market conditions.' 6'
A trader who switches from a bull straddle to a bear straddle or vice
versa places himself in a different economic position.' 62
The IRS relied on two cases to support the closed-transaction ar-
gument: Frederick A Home 63 and Gordon MacRae. '64 Neither of
these cases concerns transactions involving commodity futures or simi-
lar contracts. The opinions merely contain broad dicta that may lend
general support to the ruling's position.
159. 1977-1 C.B. 48, 49.
160. Id.
161. Bull straddles spread profit when price differentials between the straddle months in-
crease; bear straddles spread profit when price differentials between the straddle months decrease.
Schwager, supra note 34, at 13-14; see text accompanying notes 39-46 supra.
162. If an investor switches a bull straddle for a bear straddle when he changes contract
months, spread variations that before would have created gains now create losses and vice versa.
Even when switching from one bull straddle to another bull straddle the economic potential of the
new position can be substantially different from the old one. Seasonal variations in perishable
commodities give various bull or bear spreads very different prospects depending on the delivery
months. See Powers, supra note 34, at 44-45. The inherent risk involved in spread positions
whether in perishable commodities or in storable commodities or financial futures is critically
dependent on the distance between the legs of the spread; the greater the distance the greater the
risk. See D. Breeden, supra note 53, at 12. General assertions that simple spreads and butterfly
spreads are completely without risk or that one spread switched to another with a different deliv-
ery month does not at all change the investor's economic position are simply wrong. See Schwa-
ger, supra note 34, at 13-14; Tiger, supra note 40, at 15. On the other hand, certain spreads,
especially butterfly spreads, held for short periods of time, can be virtually risk-free, or can have
such a small risk that profits frequently are completely absorbed by the commission charges. See
R. Gray, supra note 25, at 29, 39-40.
163. 5 T.C. 250 (1945) (a commodity trader sold his seat on the exchange for a price lower
than what he paid for it after purchasing an identical seat on the same exchange at the lower price;
as he admitted, the sole purpose for the transaction was to claim a loss).
164. 34 T.C. 20 (1960) (purchases and sales of treasury bonds and notes had the effect of
cancelling each other out).
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The Home court disallowed the taxpayer's deduction derived from
a loss claimed on the sale of a seat on the Cotton Exchange and consid-
ered instead the completed transaction which included the purchase of
an identical seat. The combined sale and purchase left the taxpayer in
the same position as before the sale.165 The Home court relied on
Schoenberg v. Commissioner, 66 which also involved a transaction that
was characterized by a loss claimed on a sale followed by the repur-
chase of substantially identical property in a manner that precluded
any economic risk. In Gordon MacRae the taxpayer was involved in a
series of transactions consisting of purchases and sales of treasury
bonds and notes. The court noted that "[t]he steps taken, each in itself
a legitimate commercial operation, were here mirror images. ., Le.,
identical and virtually simultaneous purchases and sales."'167
Home, Schoenberg, and MacRae arguably are irrelevant because
the closing of a long (or short) commodity futures position in one
month and the virtually simultaneous opening of a long (or short) posi-
tion in a different month are not identical transactions.1 68 The closed-
transaction analysis is an attempt to catch all tax-straddle transactions
in a single objective net to avoid a case-by-case analysis. It lacks the
necessary scope because it cannot apply to the rolling of a straddle
whenever the resulting straddle has a different economic potential than
the initial straddle.
In Revenue Ruling 77-185 the IRS appears to be trying to create
an administrative wash-sale rule169 in the guise of closed-transaction
analysis for futures transactions that are part of ongoing straddles. Al-
though the loss claims stemming from such straddles may be as ficti-
165. 5 T.C. at 253-54. "Before any deduction is allowable there must have occurred some
transaction which when fully consummated left the taxpayer poorer in a material sense." Id. at
254.
166. 77 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.), af§g 30 B.T.A. 659 (1934), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 586 (1935) (an
attempt to avoid the wash-sale provisions of I.R.C. section 1091 by repurchase through an invest-
ment company that the taxpayer controlled). See note 168 infra.
167. 34 T.C. at 26-27.
168. In certain markets when conditions are stable, a trader can roll a straddle and remain in
the same economic position because the differential costs do not change. The "closed-transaction"
analysis may apply to this small number of switches. The "closed-transaction" analysis might
apply more frequently when the investor has used butterfly straddles. In those straddles, due to
their greater insulation from risk, the potential for profit is often, but not always, outweighed by
commission costs. See note 162 supra. Butterfly straddles are, however, often profitable in periods
of high market variability despite their higher transaction costs, which are caused by the larger
number of contract months and switching transactions required. See generally D. Breeden, supra
note 53.
169. A wash sale is a sale and purchase of the same or similar property within a short period
of time. I.R.C. section 1091 contains a legislative wash-sale rule for securities. The term "admin-
istrative wash sale rule" was used by Barbakoff & Sabin, supra note 12, at 5. It suggests an un-
precedented attempt by the IRS to expand section 1091 beyond its legislatively defined borders.
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tious as those that inspired wash-sale legislation, switches in straddles
are not wash sales. Even in the rare case in which the new economic
position is nearly identical to the one it replaces and the application of
an administrative wash-sale rule may be justified, the IRS is hampered
by a body of law that is contrary to the application of such a rule to
straddle transactions.
Ironically, straddle traders have used an argument similar to the
balanced-position/closed-transaction argument in unsuccessful at-
tempts to avoid tax liability for gains realized in switching delivery
months. The straddle traders, hedging against their commodity inven-
tories, sought to postpone the realization of any gains until they closed
their futures positions without repurchasing new ones. In those cases,
the IRS argued against application of a wash-sale analysis and won. 170
The IRS appears to oppose the application of the closed-transaction
doctrine to a switching transaction in which a taxpayer seeks to post-
pone realization of a straddle gain,171 but to support the application of
the doctrine to force postponement of a taxpayer's loss. 172
In Revenue Ruling 71-568173 the IRS took the position that com-
modity futures contracts are not stocks or securities for purposes of the
wash-sale provisions of section 1091 of the Internal Revenue Code.
The facts in the ruling involved a speculator who realized a loss on the
sale of one futures contract and within thirty days of the sale purchased
another contract with a different delivery month. The second contract
involved the purchase of the same underlying commodity in equal
quantity and quality.174 The IRS allowed the loss and did not apply an
administrative wash-sale rule, which it appears to have used in Reve-
nue Ruling 77-185. This earlier position can be seen as a tacit acknowl-
edgement that, at least absent any offsetting positions, commodity
futures contracts for different months are not substantially identical
property. When offsetting positions are present, as is the case with
straddle transactions, the application of Revenue Ruling 71-568 is less
170. See Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1945), rev'k 2 T.C.M.
1172 (Dec. 28, 1943); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 395 (1951), af'd, 215 F.2d
513 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'don other grounds, 350 U.S. 46 (1955); Harriss v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A.
999 (1941), aff'd, 143 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1944); Valley Waste Mills v. Page, 27 A.F.T.R. 957 (M.D.
Ga. April 11), af'd, 115 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 681 (1941).
171. This requires "switching" a long position, which involves buying a short position in the
same month to cancel out the first long position, see text accompanying note 20 supra, and then
selling another contract in the desired replacement delivery month. This simultaneous buy and
sell has the effect of maintaining a long position but changing the delivery date to a different
(more distant) month.
172. Compare Rev. Rul. 77-185, 1977-1 C.B. 48 with cases cited in note 170 supra.
173. 1971-2 C.B. 312.
174. Id.
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clear. The cases in which the IRS has successfully argued against ap-
plication of the wash-sale rule to commodity futures involve net long
futures positions offset by short positions in the physical commodity or
spot market.175 These transactions have the same offsetting balance as
straddles in which both long and short positions are in futures. Such
positions are commonly assumed by businesses hedging their inven-
tories. 176 Revenue Ruling 77-185 indicates that the IRS will no longer
follow its earlier position or that the IRS seeks to limit it to balanced
positions involved in hedging.
Congress has declared that futures contracts for delivery in differ-
ent months are not substantially identical property for purposes of the
short-sale rule of section 1233 of the I.R.C. 177 The section specifically
exempts intermarket spread or straddle transactions in commodity fu-
tures from the short-sale rules.178 Many intermarket spreads may en-
tail fewer risks than time spreads within a market and are just as likely
to create tax advantages, yet the positions involved are specifically not
treated as substantially identical assets under I.R.C. section 1233.179
Both Revenue Ruling 71-568 and the interpretation of section
1233 of the I.R.C. suggest that commodity futures contracts for differ-
ent months are not identical property and therefore are not susceptible
to a wash-sale rule.180 Furthermore, the wash-sale rule, like the closed-
transaction analysis, relies on the naive assumption that switching a
175. See notes 170-71 supra and accompanying text.
176. See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
177. See I.R.C. § 1233(e)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.1233-1(d)(2) (1956).
178. I.R.C. § 1233(e)(3).
179. See FuTu.s GAmE, supra note 14, at 222-23.
180. The Supreme Court has never addressed whether the wash-sale rule now codified in sec-
tion 1091 applies to such transactions. The Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Second Circuits
are in conflict on the issue. In Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, over the objections of the IRS, applied the wash-sale rule of section 1091 to
commodity futures switches in hedging transactions. 147 F.2d 33, rev'g 2 T.C.M. 1172 (Dec. 28,
1943), af'd on rehearing, 148 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1945). On rehearing the IRS argued:
(a) that in each switching transaction, the date of delivery ... in the contract
purchased was later than in the contract sold, thus the contracts matured at different
times;(b) that in some instances when one contract was sold and a new one purchased on the
Commodity Exchange, the parties were different;
(c) new purchases substituted for old had an additional charge for storage because the
period of storage was longer.
148 F.2d at 209. The court disagreed, characterizing the futures contracts as essentially identical
because they involved "materially or substantially the same property," and "the admitted facts
show[ed] that the purpose of petitioner... was to avoid a loss." Id.
Several years later, in Corn Prods. Ref Co. v. Commissioner, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit rejected the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and held that
the wash-sale provision was not applicable. 215 F.2d 513, 516-17 (2d Cir. 1954), af'd on other
grounds, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court holding on an
alternate ground and did not address the wash-sale issue. 350 U.S. 46, 47 (1955).
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straddle always results in creating an economic situation identical to
the original straddle. It is doubtful that the IRS's attempt to argue for a
closed-transaction analysis as a euphemism for a wash-sale rule will
withstand judicial scrutiny.
In Smith v. Commissioner, the Tax Court found the judicial, statu-
tory, and administrative precedent concerning the closed-transaction
analysis persuasive. The court held that the straddle switch resulted in
the closing of the old straddle positions for tax purposes and that gain
or loss was sustained at the time the positions were closed despite the
presence of a continuing straddle.181
D. Applicability of the Step-Transaction Doctrine.
By characterizing each of the transactions required to complete a
tax straddle as discrete steps under a step-transaction analysis, the IRS
could sidestep the difficult profit-motive analysis and more accurately
distinguish actual losses from nominal ones. 182 The judicially created
step-transaction doctrine is particularly appropriate in analyzing the
true economic substance of mixed-motive, multi-step transactions.
The step-transaction doctrine is generally characterized in two
ways.18 3 Under the end-result theory, the courts apply the step-transac-
tion doctrine when there exists a series of related steps designed and
executed as part of a unitary plan to achieve an intended result.184 The
court views the steps as a single whole transaction and adjusts the tax
consequences appropriately.18 5 Under the interdependence theory, the
court considers the objective facts and circumstances to determine
whether "the legal relations created by one transaction would have
been fruitless without a completion of the series."'1 6 The step-transac-
tion doctrine is a specific application of the broad judge-made "form
over substance" approach to business transactions.18 7
181. Smith v. Commissioner, [Regular Decisions] TAX CT. RP. (CCH) No. 38,835 (78 T.C.
No. 26, March 5, 1982).
182. See also Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 INsT. ON
FED. TAx. 247 (1954).
183. Levin & Bowen, Taxable and Tax-Free Two-Step Acquisitions and Minority Squeeze-
Outs-The TaxAspects, 36 INST. ON FED. TAx. 865, 870-71 (1978). A third approach, the bind-
ing-commitment theory, is limited to certain reorganizations and would not be applied to straddle
transactions. See Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1967).
184. Kuper v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 152, 155-56 (5th Cir. 1976).
185. Id.
186. American Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 397, 405 (1948), a fdper curiam,
177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), ceri. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950).
187. See Rev. Rul. 79-250, 1979-2 C.B. 156. See also Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(1935).
Vol. 1982:114]
DUKE LAW JOUATAL
The Tax Court recently applied the step-transaction doctrine in
Hassen v. Commissioner.188 The court disallowed a loss claimed by a
taxpayer who lost property because he defaulted on mortgage pay-
ments but who later indirectly repurchased the property. At the fore-
closure sale, the property was sold to the mortgagee for a sum equal to
the remaining mortgage balance. The taxpayer claimed a substantial
loss equal to the difference between his original basis in the property
and his outstanding mortgage debt at the time of the default. The
mortgagee later sold the building to a closely-held corporation con-
trolled by the taxpayer for the amount of the outstanding mortgage
balance plus foreclosure expenses.18 9
The IRS disallowed the taxpayer's loss under section 267(a)(1) of
the I.R.C., which disallows losses from sales of property to persons re-
lated to the seller. The IRS argued that the taxpayer had, in effect,
repurchased the property himself and that because no change had oc-
curred in his net economic position, no loss could be claimed from the
original foreclosure. 190
The taxpayer argued that his corporation's purchase of the prop-
erty did not invalidate his loss claim because his corporation bought
the building from an independent third party in a "separate and in-
dependent sale."' 9' The Tax Court, applying the step-transaction doc-
trine, rejected this contention. 9 2 The court held that the sales, though
legally independent, must be considered as components of the same
transaction. Referring to evidence of an informal plan on the part of
the taxpayer and his mortgagee for the later repurchase and to the fact
that the taxpayer suffered no genuine economic loss from the various
component transactions when taken as a whole, the court disallowed
the claimed loss. 193
The taxpayer's situation in the Hassen case is analogous to that of
a taxpayer who derives tax benefits from trading straddles. Both situa-
tions involve a taxpayer who faces little or no real economic loss, but
who seeks to treat loss-producing steps in his transaction and other off-
setting steps as having independent tax consequences despite their clear
interdependence.
The step-transaction doctrine is broader than closed-transaction
analysis and can be applied even if the taxpayer can demonstrate that
he is in a different economic position after the transaction. Under step-
188. 63 T.C. 175 (1974), aff'd, 599 F.2d 305 (1979).
189. 63 T.C. at 178-79.
190. Id. at 183.
191. Id. at 182.
192. Id. at 189-90.
193. 599 F.2d at 309.
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transaction analysis the court reviews all the steps of a transaction in
combination. Despite the technical legal finality of one particular step,
the court can determine that the step does not stand alone in a practical
sense because it is part of a prearranged series that would never have
been undertaken except with the intention of completing the series.194
To defend his claimed straddle losses against a step-transaction attack,
the taxpayer must demonstrate that not only did he intend to profit
from the overall straddle trading but that each step was motivated by
separate, legitimate economic purposes.' 95
Even a showing of independent economic significance does not al-
ways preclude a step-transaction analysis. Courts have combined steps
despite the showing that each of the steps had some independent eco-
nomic significance.' 96 If straddle transactions are examined under a
step-transaction analysis, courts can disallow claims of losses incurred
in a transaction with some economic significance when it appears that
the true economic substance of the transaction is best comprehended by
viewing it as a step in a series of steps. Under a step-transaction analy-
sis the courts may ignore economically significant losses created by
switching delivery months in a straddle by combining them with the
corresponding gains realized in later straddle steps and only recogniz-
ing the tax consequences of the entire series. This approach would re-
flect more accurately the true economic substance of the transactions.
The Smith court briefly considered the application of the step-
transaction analysis to the taxation of straddle transactions. The IRS
apparently suggested the analysis as an alternative approach should the
court reject the closed-transaction analysis. 197 Unfortunately, the court
linked the step-transaction analysis to the discredited closed-transac-
tion and wash-sale analyses and dismissed it with little independent
examination.' 98
194. This would indicate that the loss claimed in rolling the straddle was not a genuine eco-
nomic loss. See Hassen v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d at 309. See note 186 supra.
195. Rev. Rul. 79-250, 1979-2 C.B. 156, 157; cf. Rev. Rul. 78-330, 1978-2 C.B. 147 (if transac-
tions in a series have independent economic substance they will usually be given substance for tax
purposes).
196. See, ag., King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
197. See Smith v. Commissioner, [Regular Decisions] TAx CT. REP. (CCH) No. 38,835 at
2862, 2871 (78 T.C. No. 26, March 5, 1982).
198. See id at 2866-67, 2871-73. The court may have been reluctant to extend this judge-
made doctrine into a new area, or its dismissal may have been due to a misapprehension concern-
ing the applicability of the doctrine in a situation where the outcome of a series of steps was not
perfectly predictable. Id. at 2872. However, in Hassen v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 175 (1974), aft'd,
599 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1979), the Tax Court recognized that a step-transaction analysis is applica-
ble where the agreements necessary to complete successfully all the steps are not binding and,
therefore, the scheme may entail some risk of failure. See 63 T.C. at 189-90. See notes 188-93
supra and accompanying text.
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The court concluded that "prior case law and statutes do not re-
quire the integration of. . .straddle losses."'199 Of course case law and
statutes are least helpful when dealing with a previously undetected
abuse since they would address only the form of the transaction. The
step-transaction doctrine, however, like other judicial creations which
counter the elevation of form over substance, is useful where statutory
and case law concerning the form of the transaction compel a tax treat-
ment that is inappropriate from a substantive view. 200 The tax strad-
dle's creative use of offsetting positions and selective realizations to
exploit the form of commodity futures trading make it an ideal candi-
date for analysis under step-transaction principles. The Smith court, in
fact, used a step-transaction analysis when it examined the profit mo-
tive inherent in a tax straddle.201
Even if the courts conclude that the step-transaction doctrine
should not be applied to straddle transactions in general, courts should
apply it whenever they determine that the transactions comprise a tax
straddle.202 By following such a rule the courts would avoid difficult
evaluation problems. 20 3 They also would avoid imposing double taxa-
tion on tax straddlers who fail to meet the requirements of the profit-
motive test by integrating the first year's losses with the second year's
gains rather than dealing with each independently.20 4 Finally, use of
the step-transaction doctrine would allow the courts to tax accurately
the mixed-motive tax straddler despite the presence of profit motive in
his transactions.205
IV. CONCLUSION
The tax straddle is an economically significant transaction. The
tax straddler claims losses, however, that are unrelated to his actual
economic condition by claiming that the decrease in value of one leg of
199. [Regular Decisions] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) at 2873.
200. See notes 182-87 supra and accompanying text,
201. We agree with respondent that what petitioners invested in with Merrill Lynch were
commodity tax straddles-i.e., a prearranged, planned sequence of trading along the
lines studied by respondent's expert.... For purposes of section 165(c)(2), then, we
hold the relevant "transaction" to encompass petitioners entire commodity tax straddle
scheme.
[Regular Decisions] TAx CT. REP. (CCH) at 2874.
202. Id. Step-transaction doctrine as other form-over-substance doctrines should be invoked
when transactions formally of one nature are misused to avoid the otherwise applicable tax rule.
See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
203. See notes 140-49 supra and accompanying text.
204. Id.
205. See notes 54-65 supra and accompanying text.
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the straddle is a loss for income tax purposes. Recognizing the artifici-
ality of the claimed loss, the IRS has attacked its validity.
By arguing in Revenue Ruling 77-185 that the straddle transaction
used in creating the loss has no economic substance, the IRS has taken
a losing position. The IRS's closed-transaction analysis is an attempt
to apply an objective and therefore easily administrable wash-sale rule
to straddles. But the effort is based on the false assumption that strad-
dle positions in different months have identical economic significance.
The IRS's profit-motive analysis was modified and accepted by the
Tax Court in Smith v. Commissioner. The Smith opinion only justifies
use of the profit motive analysis to disallow straddle losses in the most
blatant cases. In any case where it is applied, the disallowance of strad-
dle losses under a profit-motive analysis will also create the harsh result
of double taxation. The more sophisticated tax-motivated straddlers
incorporate an element of risk, and thus profit potential, into their
transactions (particularly those entered into after the publication of the
ruling).206 The tax straddle is attractive because it produces large nom-
inal gains and losses that are unrelated to its smaller but real economic
gains and losses. When the smaller economic gains and losses exist, the
profit-motive attack fails and the tax benefits from the nominal losses
continue.
Of the possible judicial attacks on the validity of nominal straddle
losses, only the step-transaction analysis succeeds without significant
theoretical or practical flaws. The step-transaction analysis addresses
the relationship of the claimed loss to the actual economic gain or loss
of the entire group of transactions that constitute the tax straddle.
Under step-transaction analysis, the courts can ignore complete, valid
transactions, such as the closing at a loss of a commodity futures con-
tract, in favor of assessing the tax consequences of a straddle that is
entirely closed out.
Richard W. Evans
206. After the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 77-185, investors began building a degree of risk
into their tax-straddle transactions to withstand IRS challenges based on profit motive. See Fu-
tures Shock, supra note 13, at 25.
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